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RECENT CASES IN ZONING
A recent controversy in zoning is whe-
ther to classify certain zoning actions as
either legislative or judicial in nature. It
is reasonably easy to accept the adoption of
a general plan as legislative and to accept
the procedures for seeking variances as jud-
icial or quasi-judicial. But the procedure
for changing individual property from one
zone classification to another falls into a
gray area. In one sense it seems legislative
as it is only an amendment to a general zon-
ing scheme, but since such changes affect in-
dividual property owners and their neighbors
either to someone's betterment or detriment
there is individual adjudication of property
interests. This gives rise to some disagree-
ment as to the nature of these changes. The
result of categorizing such procedures as
legislative or quasi-judicial can be quite
significant. There is the question of review.
Should there be a record? What type of rec-
ord should be made? Is there a legislative
presumption of validity? Or must the record
show evidence of a balancing of the public
interest and the interests of property? Is
there a burden of production or pursuasion?
If so, who has the burden? All of these fac-
tors as well as others can affect the cost .
and manner of seeking a zoning change.
A case which is fast becoming a tandmal
decision is Fasano v. Board of County Commi
sioners of Washington County, 07 P.2d Z3 (C
1972). In this case, the plaintiffs were
homeowners who objected to a zoning change
made by the Board of County Commissioners.
A company had purchased land which had been
zoned for single family residential use in
accordance with a plan adopted in 1959. The
company desired to develop the land for mob.
ile homes and had asked and received a re-
zoning of the property to a Planned Residen.
tial Zone or P-R zone. The P-R zone was
defined in a 1963 amendment to the zoning
ordinances, but no land had been given that
classification. The Board in rezoning the
property noted that it would petiit increase
densities, so as to meet different needs in
the community. The plaintiff homeowners who
resided near the site of the rezoned propert
alleged that such a change neither conformeo
to the comprehensive plan nor had the Board
shown any substantial to the area to warrant
a change. The defendants presented three
arguments to meet this challenge: (1) that
the rezoning is presumptively valid; (2) the
the Board need not show any substantial
change to the area; and (3) that the changes
were in accordance with the comprehensive
plan. The court started its analysis by
noting that such changes were not legislativ
but quasi-judicial in nature since the chang
dealt with particular property and a partic-
ular change in use. Therefore the court
rejected any presumption of legislative val-
idity.
The court went on to state that there
should be a record and that to justify any
rezoning the record must show that the chans
is either in conformity with the comprehen-
sive plan or that the evidence demonstrates:
(1) there is a public need to be served by
the change; and (2) the need will be best
served by the change. Further, the burden
of proof is on the one seeking the change, a
the greater the degree of divergence from
the comprehensive plan the greater becomes
the burden. The case has been followed to
a large extent by Colorado in Snyder v. City
of Lakewood, 542 P.2d 371 (1975).
Under this analysis, the hearings for
rezoning would almost certainly become more
formal and the requirements of due process
would be more exacting. There would have to
be notice to all concerned parties; the
opportunity to present evidence and to rebut
evidence- and a right to an impartial tri-
bunal. Also any result would have to be
supported by the evidence. The reviewing
court would also have more leeway and be
more energetic in substituting its own opin-
ion since the "bugaboo" of interfering with
a legislative decision would be removed.
The United States Supreme Court has als:
addressed itself to the question of whether
rezoning individual property is a legislati.
Cr -rt handed down its opinion in City of
"i_€lk v.Forest City Enterprises, .
I6 SCt. 4235, 9LEd.2d32.(97'). A
veloper had purchased property in the City
!Eastlake, Ohio, which was zoned for light
Idustrial use and he then asked the city for
,zoning to multi-family use. While in the
-n-ocess of seeking this rezoning, the city
,h nded its procedure, so that all proposed
,bkoning must go before the people by refer-"Idum, and for any rezoning to be successful
te~oters must approve by 55%. Before then.ferendum, the developer challenged the
:tion in the Ohio court by alleging that the
t :ovision was a violation of procedural duerocess and defective on its face. In the
sferendum the zoning change was defeated, so
e developer continued his attack. The Ohio
apreme Court in its opinion. 324 N.E.2d
40' (1975) took the view that the requirement
a Lreferendum was defective on its face, as
t was violative of the due process clause of
,he 14th Amendment of the United States Con-
tituton. The Ohio Court stated that such a
•eferendum was an unconstitutional delegation
*f legislative authority to the people, be-
'ause there were no standards, nor could
shere by any, to prevent an arbitrary and5apricious use of the police power. The city
ippealed to the United States Supreme Court
,idwas granted certiorari, in part, because
' he Ohio Supreme Court had relied only on the
.1nited States Constitution. By a 6 to 3 vote,
:he Court reversed the Ohio Court and found
for the city. The majority opinion adopted
:e. view taken by the Ohio Supreme Court that
:he procedures for rezoning were largely leg-
islative. With a discussion of the virtues
)f democracy, the Court upheld the city's
ght to use a referendum, since the Ohio
tate Constitution specifically reserved that
, ower to the people. The plaintiff's attack
had been limited to the question of proced-
ural due process and the question whether the
decision by the voters had been arbitrary and
.apricious was not raised nor argued.
While the majority of the Court seemed
to take at face value the Ohio Supreme Court's
viewthat the rezoning procedures were legis-
latLve in nature, the minority used the anal-
ysia of the Fasano decision and evdn quoted
from that case. To the Court's minority, the
procedures for rezoning were clearly of a
judicial nature. They criticized the city of
Eastlake's referendum procedure'as too cum-
bersome and costly, and more importantly they
agreed that the majority of the community's
people had no interest in the outcome and
that they had no proper standards to apply in
avoiding an arbitrary and capricious use of
the police power. In fact, there should have
been a hearing before an impartial tribunal
with presentation of evidence.
This question of the nature of rezoning
is far from being mooted by the United States
Supreme Court decision in City of Eastlake.
The Court never really looked behind the op-
inion of the Ohio Supreme Court to determine
United States Supreme Court-opinion would not
be fully dispositive since that would only
apply to the United States Constitution. A
state court relying on its own state consti-
tution might well come to a different conclu-
sion as did the Oregon Court. However, it
should be noted that at this time, Virginia
is still in the large majority of jurisdic-
tions which view zoning procedures as legis-
lative; see Chesterfield Civic Association v.
Board of-oning Appeals of Chesterfield Coun-
ty, 215 Va. 399 (1974). But it would be well
to have more discussion on this question to
determine the relative merits of either anal-
ysis.
